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Abstract: Energy Security was considered by many of the Eastern European countries a priority in 
their fight for breaking the ties with the former Soviet Union. The dependence of the Eastern 
European countries to the Russian gas and petroleum generated for most of the local governments a 
feeling of inferiority that they were willing to replace if the opportunity will be offered. One of the 
main alternative projects to the Russian gas is the Nabucco Project designed to enable the access to 
Caspian gas for all the European countries. Knowing that a decision on the realization of the pipeline 
should be made by the end of June 2013, our article will try to illustrate the importance of the 
Nabucco Project for the regional and European energy security by studying the history of the project, 
the competing projects and the recent political evolutions of the project. This will enable researchers, 
decision makers and policy makers in the energy sector to better evaluate the Nabucco project and 
better act into promoting it. 
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1 Introduction 
The problem of energy security and the multiplication of gas sources are 
considered a topic of high importance on the European energy and foreign policy 
agenda. Even know many European countries enjoy preferential treatment from 
Russia regarding the gas prices, not all the countries are happy to be dependent on 
this energy source, especially the Eastern European countries and Romania.   
In this sense, several European countries developed gas pipeline projects in order 
to connect and multiply the gas sources. One of the world‘s richest gas regions 
interesting for the European consumer markets are the Caspian region and Middle 
East. Nevertheless till now, despite the European interests, there aren‘t any direct 
pipelines capable of bringing that gas to Europe. Therefore several EU member 
countries decided to develop their own projects in order to access this insufficiently 
used resource.  
One of the projects resulted from this decisions is the Nabucco Project, a gas 
pipeline that should pass via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to 
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Baumgarten in Austria. Considered a project of national interest for all the 
European member countries, the project encountered several turning points 
generated either by the slowness of the decision making process or by the influence 
of other international and national interests. 
Despite the series of events occurred, the Nabucco Project is today more actual 
than ever. By the end of June 2013, an international consortium that controls the 
Azeri gas resources from the Shah Deniz region will decide on the pipeline they 
will use to deliver their gas to Europe. This decision will lead to the realization or 
the end of the Nabucco Project.   
Our article will try to present the Nabucco Project from a security energy 
perspective by firstly concentrating on the history of the project. Secondly we will 
evaluate the other competing projects in relation with the Nabucco Project. Finally 
we will evaluate and analyze the current situation of the project and the steps that 
have and should be done in order to implement this project. 
 
2 History of the Nabucco Project 
The idea of the Nabucco Project appeared at the beginning of 2002 as a result of 
several commercial contacts between Austrian OMV, Turkish BOTAŞ, Hungarian 
MOL Group, Bulgarian Bulgargaz and Romanian Transgaz. A protocol was signed 
that year for the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, which has its name from a 
famous opera of Giuseppe Verdi that the five partners listened at the Vienna State 
Opera after the meeting. 
In 2003, the project enjoyed a European Commission grant designed to cover half 
of the feasibility study of the project. The new studies lead to the creation on 28 of 
June 2005 of a joint venture called Nabucco International Consortium. Soon the 
project enjoyed a strong support from the national government but also from the 
European commission that nominated a special project coordinator. In 2008, the 
German RWE became a shareholder of the consortium. The same year, Azerbaijan 
declared that they are planning to at least double their gas production in the next 
years and deliver gas to Europe. 
In the years that followed the Nabucco International Consortium and the member 
countries and companies worked on raising the awareness and the profile of the 
project with different agreements destined to attract the interests of the 
international investors. An intergovernmental agreement was signed by the 
member countries in order to institutionally prepare the project.  
Independently of the Nabucco Project, Turkey decided to build on its own the 
TANAP Pipeline reducing the length of the project to the EU member countries. 
The new project, called Nabucco-West, should therefore link the Bulgaria, 
RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
 33 
Romania, Hungary and Austria to TANAP. In May 2012, the Nabucco 
International Consortium submitted a proposal to the consortium that controlled the 
Azeri gas from the Shah Deniz region. As a result, at the beginning of 2013, NIC 
signed a funding agreement with the Shah Deniz partners according to which the 
last could buy 50% of the project if they chose Nabucco as an export route for the 
gas. The Shah Deniz should chose by 30 of June 2013 the European export route. If 
built, Nabucco-West is expected to be operational by 2017. The Nabucco-West 
pipeline will be around 1300 km long and will be scalable between 10-23 bcm. In 
Romania the pipeline will have 469 kilometres, and will go from south-west to 
north-west, starting from the Danube-crossing point upstream of the Port of 
Bechet. The problem of the pipeline in Romania is that it will cross 11 protected 
sites, two national parks, three natural reserves and 57 watercourses. 
The construction of the all Nabucco-West pipeline should last four years. The 
Nabucco project is included in the EU Trans-European Energy Network program. 
The front end engineering and design services are managed by the UK-based 
consultancy company, Penspen, and WorleyParsons, from Australia, was appointed 
as on owner‘s engineer. 
Estimated initially at 7 billion euro, the pipeline is estimated to cost 12-15 billion 
euro. The project is going to be finance by the partners and the rest should come 
from commercial financial instruments as well as international financing structures 
like the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. In order to understand the importance of the Nabucco project we 
need to analyze the competing projects threw a SWOT framework designed to 
illustrate the advantages brought by each project. 
 
3 The Competing Projects versus the Nabucco Project 
The main competitor for the original Nabucco project was South Stream. In 2006, 
the Russian company Gazprom proposed an alternative project that would have 
involved the construction of a second section of the Blue Stream pipeline beneath 
the Black Sea to Turkey, and extending this up through Bulgaria and Serbia to 
Western Hungary. Finally in 2007 the South Stream changed by bringing the 
pipeline through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia to Austria and Italy. In 
2010, the CEO of the Italian company ENI, a partner in South Stream, proposed to 
merge the project with Nabucco but the proposition was turned down by the 
Russian Minister of energy. 
Nevertheless the Nabucco project turned to be more competitive than South Stream 
and the realization of the Turkish pipeline TANAP on the original Nabucco project 
in Turkey contributed into improving the strength of the project. 
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This nevertheless didn‘t put a stop to the competition. A new project called the 
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). TAP starts from Greece and passes through Albania 
and the Adriatic Sea before going to Italy and Western Europe. This project 
isolates the Eastern and Central European countries that are strongly supporting on 
European level the diversification of energy sources. TAP appeared in 2003 as a 
project of the Swiss energy company, Axpo, and the feasibility study finished in 
2006. In 2007, the extended engineering plan was completed and this lead to the 
creation of a joint venture with the Norwegian energy company Statoil. In 2009, an 
intergovernmental agreement was signed between Italy and Albania and in 2010 it 
opened offices in both countries and in Greece. In the same year, E.ON Ruhrgas 
becomes a partner in the project. 
Like the Nabucco project, the TAP project has applied for a Third Party Access 
Exemption enabling it to enter into long term ship-or-pay gas transportation 
agreements with the Shah Deniz consortium. At the beginning of 2012, the TAP 
was the first project to be pre-selected and to enter exclusive negotiations with the 
SD Consortium and in august 2012 they signed a funding agreement including an 
option to take up to 50% equity in the project. 
The TAP project is considered to by a project of common interest by the European 
institutions and a part of the Southern Gas Corridor. In 2013, the three partner 
countries signed a memorandum of understanding and an intergovernmental 
agreement. The project is considered to be the shortest route with 791 kilometres of 
which 105 kilometres in offshore. The initial capacity of the pipeline will be about 
10 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year with an option to expand to 20 
billion. In order to respond to the worries of the South-Eastern European countries, 
the project plans to develop an underground natural gas storage facility in Albania 
for the region. 
If we compare the TAP project with the Nabucco project we notice advantages and 
weak points for both projects. In order to better see the differences we decided to 
build a comparing table constructed on the SWOT framework. 
Table 1. Comparison between the TAP and the Nabucco project 
 TAP Project Nabucco Project 
Strong points - the length and cost of the project 
791 km for TAP compared to 1300 
km for Nabucco. 1.5 billions euro 
for TAP against 12-15 billion euro 
for Nabucco. 
 
- the shareholders 
Statoil which owns 42.5% of the 
TAP projects owns 25.5% of the 
- four EU member countries 
involved 
In the Nabucco project, there are 
four countries involved Romania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria 
whereas in the TAP project we 
have a non-EU member, Albania. 
 
- the gas consumption of the 
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Shah Deniz Consortium 
 
- a short advance 
the TAP was the first project to be 
pre-selected and to enter exclusive 
negotiations with the SD 
Consortium and in august 2012 
they signed a funding agreement 
including an option to take up to 
50% equity in the project 
project partners 
The existence of four countries 
with high gas consumption may 
contribute to proposing a higher 
level of gas bought by the project 
members.  
Weak points - the gas consumption of the project 
partners 
Italy, Greece and Albania have a 
lower level of gas consumption 
than the Nabucco partners 
- the length and costs of the 
project 
1300 km compare to 791 km. 
12-15 billion euro for Nabucco 
against 1.5 billion euro for TAP 
Opportunities - the fact that the TAP project has 
only three countries involved, with 
a strong leader, Italy, may help the 
elaboration of the documentation 
necessary for convincing the Shah 
Deniz Consortium 
- the project started in 2002 and 
this may give an advantage 
opportunity in the preparation of 
the documentation and the 
solidity of the project against the 
TAP that was created in 2006 
 
- the fact that the TAP project 
has a non-EU member, Albania, 
with potential political problems, 
and Greece, with strong 
economic problems 
Threats - the fact that the TAP project has a 
non-EU member, Albania, with 
potential political problems, and 
Greece, with strong economic 
problems 
- the number of countries 
involved may generate a 
difficulty in organizing and 
elaborating in time all the 
documentation necessary for 
convincing the Shah Deniz 
Consortium 
- the shareholders 
Statoil which owns 42.5% of the 
TAP projects owns 25.5% of the 
Shah Deniz Consortium 
 
The comparison of the two project show that the TAP Project seems to have a short 
advance in front of the Nabucco project. The main advantage of the Nabucco 
project is based on the number of countries that can benefit directly or indirectly 
from the realization of the project. In the Nabucco project more EU states are 
actually crossed (AT, HU, RO, BG) and there are positive impacts on other 
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countries like SK, HR, FYROM, SB, DE, CZ or IT. NIC also has significant EU 
shareholders, BG, RO, HU and AT state companies controlling 50% of the future 
joint venture, as opposed to TAP, that is held by a Norwegian company, Statoil, 
and a Swiss company, AXPO, each with 42.5%. 
In order to use these advantages and the opportunities available, the Nabucco 
member countries and Romania should act more into promoting their project. In 
the next chapter we will try to analyze the current situation and propose several 
methods of action. 
 
4 The Current Situation of the Nabucco Project 
The debate on the creation of new gas pipelines was accelerated by the Russia-
Ukraine gas disputes that generated important consumption problems for many 
European countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. This enforced the 
requests of the countries from this region to diversify the gas sources. Moreover, 
the evaluations of the European Commission show that gas consumption is 
expected to increase from 502 cubic meters to 815 billion cub meters in 2030, a 
demand that can‘t be met by Russia alone. 
Today, the Nabucco project and partners are waiting for the decision of the Shah 
Deniz Consortium regarding the pipeline chosen to transport the Azeri gas. A 
decision between Nabucco and TAP should be made by 30 of June 2013. 
The Shah Deniz partners asked from both competing projects to give them an 
option to take up to 50% equity in the project. They also asked the two pipelines to 
organize and realize documentation capable of proving the support given by the 
member countries and the preparation of all the necessary authorizations to build 
the pipeline. An important documentation is the Environmental Impact Assessment 
because of the problems that it may generate in the construction of the pipeline. 
Thirdly the SD partners are evaluating the gas prices proposed by each consortium 
and the quantity of gas estimated to be bought by the transition countries. 
Negotiations are taking place currently to establish the final figures. 
In order to win the competition, the Nabucco-West project should do all the 
necessary work into taking advantages of its strengths. One of the main strong 
points for this project is the energy security dimension. By offering access to other 
sources of gas, especially for the Central and Eastern European countries, it enables 
these countries to be less dependent on Russia. The limitation of this dependence 
actually strengthens the European Union and the EU member countries as 
international actors. This increases flexibility and safeguards against fluctuations in 
energy supply. 
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Moreover by interconnecting with the European pipelines at Baumgarten in 
Austria, the Nabucco project offers a lot of commercial opportunities for the Azeri 
gas into Western Europe, to Germany, Czech Republic, Italy or France. With the 
expansion of the existing infrastructure, Nabucco could also connect to the entire 
SEE area. 
In the same time, the fact that the Nabucco project was initiated in 2002 gives it a 
short advantage in terms of legal documentation. Thanks to an Intergovernmental 
Agreement between Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria it has a legal 
and regulatory framework. The treaty was ratified by all five countries. But the 
most important factor of this framework is that it gives a 50 years transit right in all 
these countries. Nabucco is also the only project that has obtained a 50% 
exemption from the European Third Party Access requirements and has completed 
a Project Support Agreement. All these factors make Nabucco the best option to 
open the Southern Gas Corridor and make it commercially and financially 
attractive as well as low-risk for investors. 
Beside these elements, Romania is in the middle of this international project, being 
a declared, open and strong support of the Nabucco project. This makes our 
country‘s voice very important in the promotion of this project and it generates a 
need of a strong and well organized international position on this topic. 
Romania has all the interest in the realization of the Nabucco project. First of all, 
this will enable it to become an important actor in the European gas distribution 
network generating economic as well as political and strategic advantages. The 
negotiation power of Ukraine in the gas controversy with Russia can be an 
example. 
Secondly the Nabucco network enables Transgaz Romania and Romgaz do develop 
as companies and to foresee a future in the perspective of reduction of the gas 
production and gas capacity of Romania. These soon to be privatized companies 
have to learn how to act on a market on which they don‘t have a total control 
anymore. 
Even if a common understanding will be soon signed regarding the taxes imposed 
to the project, the Nabucco project will generate important financial benefits to 
Romania at least threw the Nabucco Romania Company. Romania will be able to 
tax the transport only after 25 years. 
Finally, the alternative projects like SouthStream or TAP exclude Romania from 
the access to alternative gas resources at low price in the context of the reduction of 
the national resources. This generates a political and economical problem from 
Romania that will raise its dependence on the Russian gas and will be less 
competitive for the heavy industry. 
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In order to prove its support for the Nabucco project, Romania has adopted in 
February 2013 a law in the Romanian Senate that reaffirms the support for the 
Nabucco project and ratifies the agreement signed by the Nabucco consortium 
since June 2011. Moreover, Romania is planning to implement a special Nabucco 
Law designed to regulate the entire institutional and legal framework necessary for 
the realization of the pipeline on Romanian soil. 
At this moment Nabucco is facing four important problems and difficulties that 
have to be analyzed to understand the current situation of the project. The first 
problem is the access to gas sources. The Nabucco project has been conceived at 
the beginning to transport the gas from Iraq, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan. Iraq has decided to limit the transportation of gas to the existing 
pipelines till they will be able explore and find other gas sources. Egypt is prepared 
to transport its gas threw Nabucco but its capacity is insufficient for the financial 
needs of the pipeline. Turkmenistan is also prepared to transport a part of its gas 
but the political situation of the country does not allow it to develop more this 
partnership. Kazakhstan is waiting for the pipeline to be realized before planning to 
transport the gas threw it. In the end the only source of gas available is the Azeri 
gas from the Shah Deniz region. This high dependence on the decision of the 
consortium actually makes possible or impossible the Nabucco project. 
The second problem is that of the competing projects and mainly the TAP project. 
This project is shorter, involves fewer countries and three strong energy 
companies, and has a shareholder in the Shah Deniz Consortium. The problem of 
the Nabucco project is to prove that it is the only European supported project being 
the only one with only EU member countries partners. Nabucco has also to prove 
that it is the best energy security project for Europe in general, and for the Central 
and Eastern European countries especially. 
The third problem is that of the liquefied petroleum gas. Different studies have 
shown that there are important resources of LPG in Romania, Bulgaria and Greece 
that can represent an alternative solution to the Caspian gas. This is used by the 
opponents of the Nabucco project in order to diminish the importance of this 
project and to accuse a potential low involvement in Nabucco of Romania and 
Bulgaria. These accusations are accentuated by the existence of an alternative LPG 
project between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary. Romania has to 
prove that these projects aren‘t in a direct competition that it still supports 
politically and economically the Nabucco project. 
Finally, the fourth problem is that of the financing of the project. With costs 
estimated at 12-15 billion euro the Nabucco project is a lot more expensive than the 
TAP project, with 1.5 billion euro. The funds necessary for building the pipeline 
have to be supported by the partners of the project and commercial and 
international aid has to be attracted in order assure the finances for the project. 
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Nabucco has to increase the initial contacts with the European Investment Bank 
and the European Bank for Development and Reconstruction. Knowing that all the 
project suppose a return on investment for the partners, they have to show to the 
Shah Deniz consortium that they will manage to have large profits even with this 
construction costs. A solution for the Nabucco partner countries and companies is 
to propose and assume the direct acquisition of large quantities of gas in the future 
at competitive costs for all the parties involved. In the Romanian case, Romgaz is 
the company that is negotiating the future Romanian gas acquisitions and it should 
be pushed to bid more in order to help the realization of the Nabucco project. 
These four problems actually lead to three other questions of debate regarding 
Romania‘s implication in the Nabucco project. Firstly is to evaluate the financial 
opportunity for Romania to get involved in the Nabucco project. Beside the energy 
security advantages, is the Nabucco project bringing to Romania cheaper gas. 
Moreover are Transgaz and Romgaz capable of supporting financially the project 
and what is Romanian going to do in the case of the privatization of the two 
companies. 
Secondly, is the Nabucco project still a regional political and government 
supported project? The withdrawals of the German RWE company and the 
reduction of the implication of the Hungarian MOL are reasons from Romania to 
believe that the Nabucco is facing important political problems? Romania should 
evaluate the new political context and push for an open political support for the 
project from all the countries implicated. A solution may be to elaborate a common 
international campaign to support the project. 
This leads to the third question, or more exactly the political interests of the Shah 
Deniz shareholders. First of all the Azeri company, SOCAR, only owns 10% of the 
company. Even if the weight of the company is not very important, the Azeri 
government has an important saying in determining the winner of the competition 
between the Nabucco and the TAP pipeline. This leads us to identifying the main 
Azeri political and economic interests. Firstly this country tries to consolidate its 
political and economic interests in the European Union. They want to improve their 
relations with the EU, they see a European future for the country and they desire to 
have access to the European market. Secondly, Azerbaijan has political and 
diplomatic tensions with Armenia and the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
While the Azeris have been supported by Turkey in this matter, Azerbaijan was 
criticized by the EU regarding this diplomatic and political situation. 
The other shareholders of the Shah Deniz consortium are British Petroleum 
(25.5%), a British multinational company, forth company in the world, Statoil 
(25.5%), the Norwegian state owned company partner in the TAP project, TOTAL 
SA (10%), a strong French multinational company, LukAgip (10%), formed from 
the Italian ENI and Russian Lukoil partners in SouthStream, NIOC (10%), the 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                        Vol. 6, no. 1/2013 
 40 
Iranian national gas company refused by the Nabucco project and TPAO (9%), a 
Turkish national company partner in SouthStream. 
The evaluation of these shareholders shows that without a strong implication from 
the Nabucco partners, it will be very hard to generate a positive result. The first 
objective of the Nabucco member countries is to push for an economical decision 
from the Shah Deniz Consortium in order to increase the influence of British 
Petroleum and Total SA and reduce the influence of Statoil that should be pushed 
into reflecting on the opportunities offered by the Nabucco project. Once this 
objective has been reached the Nabucco partners should build a strong international 
political campaign to support the project in Norway, to convince Statoil, and in 
Azerbaijan, for a political implication of the Azeri government. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The European energy security is considered to be a key topic in Europe. 
Nevertheless from the public discourse to real political action a long way still has 
to be done. The case of the Nabucco project shows the low implication of the 
European Union in a decision that can influence the future of many Europeans and 
achieve energy sufficiency and diversity for Europe. Even if the project truly 
reflects the idea of a common European public interest, the EU has decided to 
avoid deciding between Nabucco and the TAP project. The Nabucco member 
countries have to understand that the implications of this project are larger than that 
of an economic and financial decision. This can lead to gas independence from the 
Russian gas for Central and Eastern European countries but also for Europe in 
general. Russia‘s influence in Europe will have a blow that will most certainly not 
be accepted so easily by a country that is used in having the control over the 
European natural resources. Romania‘s role in this project is one of great 
importance. The country has publicly assumed the role of leader of this project but 
hasn‘t made the steps necessary in actually leading the international campaign for 
the Nabucco project. Romania has to quickly act in this direction that will make 
Romania a regional energy connector and power. 
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